Levels of consciousness and psychopathology: beyond the dualism body-mind


Published: January 17, 2020
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In the human being the levels of consciousness condition the different modalities of relationship and perception of reality. The level of primary consciousness is that of the consciousness of the Ego and corresponds to the individual perception of a personality that tends to remain stable and that relates interdependently and tends to be static with others. The consciousness of a higher order is that of the individual reflexive Subject, who if conscious of himself poses himself as the dynamic organizing center of the personality and interacts with the other accepting a reciprocal and changeable dependence. The awareness of being Subject in relation is a level of consciousness of a higher order, which allows the co-reflection with the other Subject in a relationship of intersubjectivity. The psychopathology of the three main personality organizations - neurotic, borderline, psychotic - is articulated in these three levels of consciousness and conditions the relationship with the therapist. The treatment coincides with the stimulus to the reflexive function of the Subject, understood as the ability to self-serving, to perceive one's own and others' emotional and unconscious world, to mentalize and evolve the mode of relationship from symbiotic interdependence to intersubjectivity.


Cozzaglio, P. (2020). Levels of consciousness and psychopathology: beyond the dualism body-mind. Ricerca Psicoanalitica, 28(1), 67–85. https://doi.org/10.4081/rp.2017.188

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