The theoretical-clinical perspective of George Downing and the conception of the subject as a living system


Published: April 30, 2010
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The Author initially describes the clinical work carried out over the years by George Downing, and explains the underlying theoretical references, with particular reference to the concept of "procedural memory" as an explanatory construct of the interactive quality that characterises every human relationship from the very first days of life. In a second time he tries to insert this concept within a wider perspective that is placed, from an epistemic point of view, in the theory of complex dynamic and non-linear systems. The motivation of the subject-system, in this perspective, is not given by the attempt to create or maintain links with the object, but by seeking or regaining the state of "systemic coherence" in a creative and continuous process. Also the concept of "recognition" is revisited according to this perspective, starting from the description given by Hegel in his Phenomenology of the spirit and in the description of the process of self-consciousness. It is inferred that the explanation of the analyst's implicit theoretical references is a sine qua non condition for giving life, within the analytic process, to a path that merges the presence of the subject's own internal states and therefore to himself.


Milanesi, P. (2010). The theoretical-clinical perspective of George Downing and the conception of the subject as a living system. Ricerca Psicoanalitica, 21(1), 19–30. https://doi.org/10.4081/rp.2010.488

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